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Abstract 
 
Research in behavioral corporate finance takes two distinct approaches. The first emphasizes that 
investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial financing and investment decisions as 
rational responses to securities market mispricing. The second approach emphasizes that 
managers are less than fully rational. It studies the effect of nonstandard preferences and 
judgmental biases on managerial decisions. This survey reviews the theory, empirical challenges, 
and current evidence pertaining to each approach. Overall, the behavioral approaches help to 
explain a number of important financing and investment patterns. The survey closes with a list of 
open questions. 
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I.  Introduction 
Corporate finance aims to explain the financial contracts and the real investment behavior 
that emerge from the interaction of managers and investors. Thus, a complete explanation of 
financing and investment patterns requires an understanding of the beliefs and preferences of 
these two sets of agents. The majority of research in corporate finance assumes a broad 
rationality. Agents are supposed to develop unbiased forecasts about future events and use these 
to make decisions that best serve their own interests. As a practical matter, this means that 
managers can take for granted that capital markets are efficient, with prices rationally reflecting 
public information about fundamental values. Likewise, investors can take for granted that 
managers will act in their self-interest, rationally responding to incentives shaped by 
compensation contracts, the market for corporate control, and other governance mechanisms. 
This paper surveys research in behavioral corporate finance. This research replaces the 
traditional rationality assumptions with potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions. The 
literature is divided into two general approaches, and we organize the survey around them. 
Roughly speaking, the first approach emphasizes the effect of investor behavior that is less than 
fully rational, and the second considers managerial behavior that is less than fully rational. For 
each line of research, we review the basic theoretical frameworks, the main empirical challenges, 
and the empirical evidence. Of course, in practice, both channels of irrationality may operate at 
the same time; our taxonomy is meant to fit the existing literature, but it does suggest some 
structure for how one might, in the future, go about combining the two approaches.  
The “irrational investors approach” assumes that securities market arbitrage is imperfect, 
and thus that prices can be too high or too low. Rational managers are assumed to perceive 
mispricings, and to make decisions that may encourage or respond to mispricing. While their 
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decisions may maximize the short-run value of the firm, they may also result in lower long-run 
values as prices correct. In the simple theoretical framework we outline, managers balance three 
objectives: fundamental value, catering, and market timing. Maximizing fundamental value has 
the usual ingredients. Catering refers to any actions intended to boost share prices above 
fundamental value. Market timing refers specifically to financing decisions intended to capitalize 
on temporary mispricings, generally via the issuance of overvalued securities and the repurchase 
of undervalued ones.  
Empirical tests of the irrational investors model face a significant challenge: measuring 
mispricing. We discuss how this issue has been tackled and the ambiguities that remain. Overall, 
despite some unresolved questions, the evidence suggests that the irrational investors approach 
has a considerable degree of descriptive power. We review studies on investment behavior, 
merger activity, the clustering and timing of corporate security offerings, capital structure, 
corporate name changes, dividend policy, earnings management, and other managerial decisions. 
We also identify some disparities between the theory and the evidence. For example, while 
catering to fads has potential to reduce long-run value, the literature has yet to clearly document 
significant long-term value losses. 
The second approach to behavioral corporate finance, the “irrational managers approach,” 
is less developed at this point. It assumes that managers have behavioral biases, but retains the 
rationality of investors, albeit limiting the governance mechanisms they can employ to constrain 
managers. Following the emphasis of the current literature, our discussion centers on the biases 
of optimism and overconfidence. A simple model shows how these biases, in leading managers 
to believe their firms are undervalued, encourage overinvestment from internal resources, and a 
preference for internal to external finance, especially internal equity. We note that the predictions 
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of the optimism and overconfidence models typically look very much like those of agency and 
asymmetric information models. 
In this approach, the main obstacles for empirical tests include distinguishing predictions 
from standard, non-behavioral models, as well as empirically measuring managerial biases. 
Again, however, creative solutions have been proposed. The effects of optimism and 
overconfidence have been empirically studied in the context of merger activity, corporate 
investment-cash flow relationships, entrepreneurial financing and investment decisions, and the 
structure of financial contracts. Separately, we discuss the potential of a few other behavioral 
patterns that have received some attention in corporate finance, including bounded rationality 
and reference-point preferences. As in the case of investor irrationality, the real economic losses 
associated with managerial irrationality have yet to be clearly quantified, but some evidence 
suggests that they are very significant.  
Taking a step back, it is important to note that the two approaches take very different 
views about the role and quality of managers, and have very different normative implications as 
a result. That is, when the primary source of irrationality is on the investor side, long-term value 
maximization and economic efficiency requires insulating managers from short-term share price 
pressures. Managers need to be insulated to achieve the flexibility necessary to make decisions 
that may be unpopular in the marketplace. This may imply benefits from internal capital markets, 
barriers to takeovers, and so forth. On the other hand, if the main source of irrationality is on the 
managerial side, efficiency requires reducing discretion and obligating managers to respond to 
market price signals. The stark contrast between the normative implications of these two 
approaches to behavioral corporate finance is one reason why the area is fascinating, and why 
more work in the area is needed.  
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Overall, our survey suggests that the behavioral approaches can help to explain a range of 
financing and investment patterns, while at the same time depend on a relatively small set of 
realistic assumptions. Moreover, there is much room to grow before the field reaches maturity. In 
an effort to stimulate that growth, we close the survey with a short list of open questions. 
 
II.  The irrational investors approach 
We start with one extreme, in which rational managers coexist with irrational investors. 
There are two key building blocks here. First, irrational investors must influence securities 
prices. This requires limits on arbitrage. Second, managers must be smart in the sense of being 
able to distinguish market prices and fundamental value. 
The literature on market inefficiency is far too large to survey here. It includes such 
phenomena as the January effect; the effect of trading hours on price volatility; post-earnings-
announcement drift; momentum; delayed reaction to news announcements; positive 
autocorrelation in earnings announcement effects; Siamese twin securities that have identical 
cash flows but trade at different prices, negative “stub” values; closed-end fund pricing patterns; 
bubbles and crashes in growth stocks; related evidence of mispricing in options, bond, and 
foreign exchange markets; and so on. These patterns, and the associated literature on arbitrage 
costs and risks, for instance short-sales constraints, that facilitate mispricings, are surveyed by 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Shleifer (2000). In the interest of space, we refer the reader to 
these excellent sources, and for the discussion of this section we simply take as given that 
mispricings can and do occur.  
But even if capital markets are inefficient, why assume that corporate managers are 
“smart” in the sense of being able to identify mispricing? One can offer several justifications. 
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First, corporate managers have superior information about their own firm. This is underscored by 
the evidence that managers earn abnormally high returns on their own trades, as in Muelbroek 
(1992), Seyhun (1992), or Jenter (2004). Managers can also create an information advantage by 
managing earnings, a topic to which we will return, or with the help of conflicted analysts, as for 
example in Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003).  
Second, corporate managers also have fewer constraints than equally “smart” money 
managers. Consider two well-known models of limited arbitrage: DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, 
and Waldmann (1990) is built on short horizons and Miller (1977) on short-sales constraints. 
CFOs tend to be judged on longer horizon results than are money managers, allowing them to 
take a view on market valuations in a way that money managers cannot.1 Also, short-sales 
constraints prevent money managers from mimicking CFOs. When a firm or a sector becomes 
overvalued, corporations are the natural candidates to expand the supply of shares. Money 
managers are not. 
Third and finally, managers might just follow intuitive rules of thumb that allow them to 
identify mispricing even without a real information advantage. In Baker and Stein (2004), one 
such successful rule of thumb is to issue equity when the market is particularly liquid, in the 
sense of a small price impact upon the issue announcement. In the presence of short-sales 
constraints, unusually high liquidity is a symptom of the fact that the market is dominated by 
irrational investors, and hence is overvalued. 
 
                                                
1 For example, suppose a manager issues equity at $50 per share. Now if those shares subsequently double, the 
manager might regret not delaying the issue, but he will surely not be fired, having presided over a rise in the stock 
price. In contrast, imagine a money manager sells (short) the same stock at $50. This might lead to considerable 
losses, an outflow of funds, and, if the bet is large enough, perhaps the end of a career. 
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A.  Theoretical framework 
We use the assumptions of inefficient markets and smart managers to develop a simple 
theoretical framework for the irrational investors approach. The framework has roots in Fischer 
and Merton (1984), De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1989), Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990b), and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), but our particular derivation 
borrows most from Stein (1996).  
In the irrational investors approach, the manager balances three conflicting goals. The 
first is to maximize fundamental value. This means selecting and financing investment projects 
to increase the rationally risk-adjusted present value of future cash flows. To simplify the 
analysis, we do not explicitly model taxes, costs of financial distress, agency problems or 
asymmetric information. Instead, we specify fundamental value as  
( ) KKf −⋅, , 
where f is increasing and concave in new investment K. To the extent that any of the usual 
market imperfections leads the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem to fail, financing may enter f 
alongside investment. 
The second goal is to maximize the current share price of the firm’s securities. In perfect 
capital markets, the first two objectives are the same, since the definition of market efficiency is 
that prices equal fundamental value. But once one relaxes the assumption of investor rationality, 
this need not be true, and the second objective is distinct. In particular, the second goal is to 
“cater” to short-term investor demands via particular investment projects or otherwise packaging 
the firm and its securities in a way that maximizes appeal to investors. Through such catering 
activities, managers influence the temporary mispricing, which we represent by the function 
( )⋅δ , 
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where the arguments of δ depend on the nature of investor sentiment. The arguments might 
include investing in a particular technology, assuming a conglomerate or single-segment 
structure, changing the corporate name, managing earnings, initiating a dividend, and so on. In 
practice, the determinants of mispricing may well vary over time.  
The third goal is to exploit the current mispricing for the benefit of existing, long-run 
investors. This is done by a “market timing” financing policy whereby managers supply 
securities that are temporarily overvalued and repurchase those that are undervalued. Such a 
policy transfers value from the new or the outgoing investors to the ongoing, long-run investors; 
the transfer is realized as prices correct in the long run.2 For simplicity, we focus here on 
temporary mispricing in the equity markets, and so δ refers to the difference between the current 
price and the fundamental value of equity. More generally, each of the firm’s securities may be 
mispriced to some degree. By selling a fraction of the firm e, long run shareholders gain 
( )⋅δe . 
We leave out the budget constraint, lumping together the sale of new and existing shares. Instead 
of explicitly modeling the flow of funds and any potential financial constraints, we will consider 
the reduced form impact of e on fundamental value.  
It is worth noting that other capital market imperfections can lead to a sort of catering 
behavior. For example, reputation models in the spirit of Holmstrom (1982) can lead to earnings 
management, inefficient investment, and excessive swings in corporate strategy even when the 
capital markets are not fooled in equilibrium.3 Viewed in this light, the framework here is 
                                                
2 Of course, we are also using the market inefficiency assumption here in assuming that managerial efforts to capture 
a mispricing do not completely destroy it in the process, as they would in the rational expectations world of Myers 
and Majluf (1984). In other words, investors underreact to corporate decisions designed to exploit mispricing. This 
leads to some testable implications, as we discuss below. 
3 For examples, see Stein (1989) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990). For a comparison of rational expectations and 
inefficient markets in this framework, see Aghion and Stein (2004). 
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relaxing the assumptions of rational expectations in Holmstrom, in the case of catering, and 
Myers and Majluf (1984), in the case of market timing.  
Putting the goals of fundamental value, catering, and market timing into one objective 
function, the irrational investors approach has the manager choosing investment and financing to 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )⋅−+⋅+−⋅ δλδλ 1,max
,
eKKf
eK
, 
where λ, between zero and one, specifies the manager’s horizon. When λ equals one, the 
manager cares only about creating value for existing, long-run shareholders, the last term drops 
out, and there is no distinct impact of catering. However, even an extreme long-horizon manager 
cares about short-term mispricing for the purposes of market timing, and thus may cater to short-
term mispricing to further this objective. With a shorter horizon, maximizing the stock price 
becomes an objective in its own right, even without any concomitant equity issues.  
We take the managerial horizon as given, exogenously set by personal characteristics, 
career concerns, and the compensation contract. If the manager plans to sell equity or exercise 
options in the near term, his portfolio considerations may lower λ. However, managerial horizon 
may also be endogenous. For instance, consider a venture capitalist who recognizes a bubble. He 
might offer a startup manager a contract that loads heavily on options and short-term incentives, 
since he cares less about valuations that prevail beyond the IPO lock-up period. Career concerns 
and the market for corporate control can also combine to shorten horizons, since if the manager 
does not maximize short-run prices, the firm may be acquired and the manager fired. 
Differentiating with respect to K and e gives the optimal investment and financial policy 
of a rational manager operating in inefficient capital markets: 
( ) ( ) ( )⋅+−=⋅ − KK eKf δλλ11, , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⋅++⋅=⋅− − ee eKf δδ λλ1, . 
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In words, the first condition is about investment policy. The marginal value created from 
investment is weighed against the standard cost of capital, normalized to be one here, net of the 
impact that this incremental investment has on mispricing, and hence its effect through 
mispricing on catering and market timing gains. The second condition is about financing. The 
marginal value lost from shifting the firm’s current capital structure toward equity is weighed 
against the direct market timing gains and the impact that this incremental equity issuance has on 
mispricing, and hence its effect on catering and market timing gains. This is a lot to swallow at 
once, so we consider some special cases. 
Investment policy. Investment and financing are separable if both δK and fe are equal to 
zero. Then the investment decision reduces to the familiar perfect markets condition of fK equal 
to unity. Real consequences of mispricing for investment thus arise in two ways. In Stein (1996) 
and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), fe is not equal to zero. There is an optimal capital 
structure, or at least an upper bound on debt capacity. The benefits of issuing or repurchasing 
equity in response to mispricing are balanced against the reduction in fundamental value that 
arises from too much (or possibly too little) leverage. In Polk and Sapienza (2004) and Gilchrist, 
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004), there is no optimal capital structure, but δK is not equal to 
zero: mispricing is itself a function of investment. Polk and Sapienza focus on catering effects 
and do not consider financing (e equal to zero in this setup), while Gilchrist et al. model the 
market timing decisions of managers with long horizons (λ equal to one). 
Financial policy. The demand curve for a firm’s equity slopes down under the natural 
assumption that δe is negative, e.g., issuing shares partly corrects mispricing.4 When investment 
and financing are separable, managers act like monopolists. This is easiest to see when managers 
                                                
4 Gilchrist et al. (2004) model this explicitly with heterogeneous investor beliefs and short-sales constraints. 
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have long horizons, and they sell down the demand curve until marginal revenue δ is equal to 
marginal cost –eδe. Note that price remains above fundamental value even after the issue: 
“corporate arbitrage” moves the market toward, but not all the way to, market efficiency.5 
Managers sell less equity when they care about short-run stock price (λ less than one, here). For 
example, in Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2004), managers expect to sell their own shares soon 
after the IPO and so issue less as a result. Managers also sell less equity when there are costs of 
suboptimal leverage. 
Other corporate decisions. Managers do more than simply invest and issue equity, and 
this framework can be expanded to accommodate other decisions. Consider dividend policy. 
Increasing or initiating a dividend may simultaneously affect both fundamental value, through 
taxes, and the degree of mispricing, if investors categorize stocks according to payout policy as 
they do in Baker and Wurgler (2004a). The tradeoff is  
( ) ( ) ( )⋅+=⋅− − dd eKf δλλ1, , 
where the left-hand side is the tax cost of dividends, for example, and the right-hand side is the 
market timing gain, if the firm is simultaneously issuing equity, plus the catering gain, if the 
manager has short horizons. In principle, a similar tradeoff governs the earnings management 
decision or corporate name changes; however, in the latter case, the fundamental costs of 
catering would presumably be small. 
 
B.  Empirical challenges 
The framework outlined above suggests a role for securities mispricing in investment, 
financing, and other corporate decisions. The main challenge for empirical tests in this area is 
                                                
5 Total market timing gains may be even higher in a dynamic model where managers can sell in small increments 
down the demand curve. 
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measuring mispricing, which by its nature is hard to pin down. Researchers have found several 
ways to operationalize empirical tests, but none of them is perfect. 
Ex ante misvaluation. One option is to take an ex ante measure of mispricing, for 
instance a scaled-price ratio in which a market value in the numerator is related to some measure 
of fundamental value in the denominator. Perhaps the most common choice is the market-to-
book ratio: A high market-to-book suggests that the firm may be overvalued. Consistent with this 
idea, and the presumption that mispricing corrects in the long run, market-to-book is found to be 
inversely related to future stock returns in the cross-section by Fama and French (1992) and in 
the time-series by Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall (1998). Also, extreme 
values of market-to-book are connected to extreme investor expectations by Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994), La Porta (1996), and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).  
One difficulty that arises with this approach is that the market-to-book ratio or another ex 
ante measure of mispricing may be correlated with an array of firm characteristics. Book value is 
not a precise estimate of fundamental value, but rather a summary of past accounting 
performance. Thus, firms with excellent growth prospects tend to have high market-to-book 
ratios, and those with agency problems might have low ratios—and perhaps these considerations, 
rather than mispricing, drive investment and financing decisions. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, 
and Teoh (2003) and Ang and Cheng (2003) discount analyst earnings forecasts to construct an 
arguably less problematic measure of fundamentals than book value. 
Another factor that limits this approach is that a precise ex ante measure of mispricing 
would represent a profitable trading rule. There must be limits to arbitrage that prevent rational 
investors from fully exploiting such rules and trading away the information they contain about 
mispricing. But on a more positive note, the same intuition suggests that variables like market-to-
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book are likely to be a more reliable mispricing metric in regions of the data where short-sales 
constraints and other (measurable) arbitrage costs and risks are most severe. This observation has 
been exploited as an identification strategy.  
Ex post misvaluation. A second option is to use the information in future returns. The 
idea is that if stock prices routinely decline after a corporate event, one might infer that they were 
inflated at the time of the event. However, as detailed in Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000), this approach is also subject to several critiques.  
The most basic critique is the joint hypothesis problem: a predictable “abnormal” return 
might mean there was misvaluation ex ante, or simply that the definition of “normal” expected 
return (e.g., CAPM) is wrong. Perhaps the corporate event systematically coincides with changes 
in risk, and hence the return required in an efficient capital market. Another simple but important 
critique regards economic significance. Market value-weighting or focusing on NYSE/AMEX 
firms may reduce abnormal returns or cause them to disappear altogether. 
There are also statistical issues. For instance, corporate events are often clustered in time 
and by industry—IPOs are an example considered in Brav (2000)—and thus abnormal returns 
may not be independent. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) show that 
inference with buy-and-hold returns (for each event) is challenging. Calendar-time portfolios, 
which consist of an equal- or value-weighted average of all firms making a given decision, have 
fewer problems here, but the changing composition of these portfolios adds another complication 
to standard tests. Loughran and Ritter (2000) also argue that such an approach is a less powerful 
test of mispricing, since the clustered events have the worst subsequent performance. A final 
statistical problem is that many studies cover only a short sample period. Schultz (2003) shows 
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that this can lead to a small sample bias if managers engage in “pseudo” market timing, making 
decisions in response to past rather than future price changes.  
Analyzing aggregate time series resolves some of these problems. Like the calendar time 
portfolios, time series returns are more independent. There are also established time-series 
techniques, e.g. Stambaugh (1999), to deal with small-sample biases. Nonetheless, the joint 
hypothesis problem remains, since rationally required returns may vary over time. 
But even when these econometric issues can be solved, interpretational issues may 
remain. For instance, suppose investors have a tendency to overprice firms that have genuinely 
good growth opportunities. If so, even investment that is followed by low returns need not be ex 
ante inefficient. Investment may have been responding to omitted measures of investment 
opportunities, not to the misvaluation itself. 
Cross-sectional interactions. Another identification strategy is to exploit the finer cross-
sectional predictions of the theory. In this spirit, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) consider the 
prediction that if fe is positive, mispricing should be more relevant for financially constrained 
firms. More generally, managerial horizons or the fundamental costs of catering to sentiment 
may vary across firms in a measurable way. Of course, even in this approach, one still has to 
proxy for mispricing with an ex ante or ex post method. To the extent that the hypothesized 
cross-sectional pattern appears strongly in the data, however, objections about the measure of 
mispricing lose some steam. 
 
C.  Investment policy 
Of paramount importance are the real consequences of market inefficiency. It is one thing 
to say that investor irrationality has an impact on capital market prices, or even financing policy, 
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which lead to transfers of wealth among investors. It is another to say that mispricing leads to 
underinvestment, overinvestment, or the general misallocation of capital and deadweight losses 
for the economy as a whole. In this subsection we review research on how market inefficiency 
affects real investment, mergers and acquisitions, and diversification. 
 
C.1.  Real investment 
In the rational managers, irrational investors framework, mispricing influences real 
investment in two ways. First, investment may itself be a characteristic that is subject to 
mispricing (δK>0 above). Investors may overestimate the value of investment in particular 
technologies, for example. Second, a financially constrained firm (fe>0 above) may be forced to 
pass up fundamentally valuable investment opportunities if it is undervalued. 
Most research has looked at the first type of effect. Of course, anecdotal evidence of this 
effect comes from bubble episodes; it was with the late 1920s bubble fresh in mind that Keynes 
(1936) argued that short-term investor sentiment is, at least in some eras, a major or dominant 
determinant of investment. More recent US stock market episodes generally viewed as bubbles 
include the electronics boom in 1959-62, growth stocks in 1967-68, the “nifty fifty” in the early 
1970s, gambling stocks in 1977-78, natural resources, high tech, and biotechnology stocks in the 
1980s, and the Internet in the late 1990s; see Malkiel (1990) for an anecdotal review of some of 
these earlier bubbles, and Ofek and Richardson (2002) on the Internet. See Kindleberger (2000) 
for an attempt to draw general lessons from bubbles and crashes over several hundred years, and 
for anecdotal remarks on their sometimes dramatic real consequences. 
The first modern empirical studies in this area asked whether investment is sensitive to 
stock prices over and above direct measures of the marginal product of capital, such as cash flow 
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or profitability. If it is not, they reasoned, then the univariate link between investment and stock 
valuations likely just reflects the standard, efficient-markets Q channel. This approach did not 
lead to a clear conclusion, however. For example, Barro (1990) argues for a strong independent 
effect of stock prices, while Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990b) and Blanchard, Rhee, and 
Summers (1993) conclude that the incremental effect is weak.  
The more recent wave of studies has taken a different tack. Rather than controlling for 
fundamentals and looking for a residual effect of stock prices, they try to proxy for the 
mispricing component of stock prices and examine whether it affects investment. In this spirit, 
Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 2004), Panageas (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2004), and Gilchrist, 
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004) all find evidence that investment is sensitive to proxies for 
mispricing. Of course, the generic concern is that the mispricing proxies are still just picking up 
fundamentals. To refute this, Polk and Sapienza, for example, consider the finer prediction that 
investment should be more sensitive to short-term mispricing when managerial horizons are 
shorter. They find that investment is indeed more sensitive to mispricing proxies when share 
turnover is higher, i.e., where the average shareholder’s horizon is shorter. 
The second type of mispricing-driven investment is tested in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 
(2003). Stein (1996) predicts that investment will be most sensitive to mispricing in equity-
dependent firms, i.e. firms that have no option but to issue equity to finance their marginal 
investment, because long-horizon managers of undervalued firms would rather underinvest than 
issue undervalued shares. Using several proxies for equity dependence, Baker et al. confirm that 
investment is more sensitive to stock prices in equity-dependent firms. 
Overall, the recent studies suggest that some portion of the effect of stock prices on 
investment is a response to mispricing, but key questions remain. The actual magnitude of the 
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effect of mispricing has not been pinned down, even roughly. The efficiency implications are 
also unclear. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2004) find that high 
investment is associated with lower future stock returns in the cross section, and Lamont (2000) 
finds a similar result for planned investment in the time series. However, sentiment and 
fundamentals seem likely to be correlated, and so, as mentioned previously, even investment 
followed by low returns may not be ex ante inefficient. Finally, even granting an empirical link 
between overpricing and investment, it is hard to determine the extent to which managers are 
rationally fanning the flames of overvaluation, as in the catering piece of our simple theoretical 
framework, or are simply just as overoptimistic as their investors. We return to the effects of 
managerial optimism in the second part of the survey.  
 
C.2.  Mergers and acquisitions 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a market timing model of acquisitions. They assume 
that acquirers are overvalued, and the motive for acquisitions is not to gain synergies, but to 
preserve some of their temporary overvaluation for long-run shareholders. Specifically, by 
acquiring less-overvalued targets with overpriced stock (or, less interestingly, undervalued 
targets with cash), overvalued acquirers can cushion the fall for their shareholders by leaving 
them with more hard assets per share. Or, if the deal’s value proposition caters to a perceived 
synergy that causes the combined entity to be overvalued, as might have happened in the late 
1960s conglomerates wave (see below), then the acquirer can still gain a long-run cushion effect, 
while offering a larger premium to the target.  
The market timing approach to mergers helps to unify a number of stylized facts. The 
defensive motive for the acquisition, and the idea that acquisitions are further facilitated when 
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catering gains are available, help to explain the time-series link between merger volume and 
stock prices, e.g., Golbe and White (1988).6 The model also predicts that cash acquirers earn 
positive long-run returns while stock acquirers earn negative long-run returns, consistent with the 
findings of Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
Recent papers have found further evidence for market timing mergers. Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh (2003) and Ang and Cheng (2003) find that market-level mispricing 
proxies and merger volume are positively correlated, and (within this) that acquirers tend to be 
more overpriced than targets. They also find evidence that offers for undervalued targets are 
more likely to be hostile, and that overpriced acquirers pay higher takeover premia. Bouwman, 
Fuller, and Nain (2003) find evidence suggestive of a short-term catering effect. In high-
valuation periods, investors welcome acquisition announcements, yet the subsequent returns of 
mergers made in those periods are the worst. Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2004) find that FDI 
outflows, which are often simply cross-border acquisitions, increase with the current aggregate 
market-to-book ratio of the acquirer’s stock market and decrease with subsequent returns on that 
market. All of these patterns are consistent with overvaluation-driven merger activity.  
An unresolved question in the Shleifer-Vishny framework is why managers would prefer 
a stock-for-stock merger to an equity issue if the market timing gains are similar. One 
explanation is that a merger more effectively hides the underlying market timing motive from 
investors. Baker, Coval, and Stein (2004) consider another mechanism that can also help explain 
a generic preference for equity issues via merger.7 The first ingredient of the story is that the 
acquiring firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for its shares, as in Shleifer (1986) and 
                                                
6 See Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) for a somewhat different misvaluation-based explanation of this link, 
and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) for an explanation based on technological change in efficient markets.  
7 For example, in the case of S&P 100 firms over 1999-2001, Fama and French (2004) find that the amount of equity 
raised in mergers is roughly 40 times that raised in SEOs.  
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Harris and Gurel (1986). The second ingredient is that some investors follow the path of least 
resistance, passively accepting the acquirer’s shares as consideration even when they would not 
have actively participated in an equity issue. With these two assumptions, the price impact of a 
stock-financed merger can be much smaller than the price impact of an SEO. Empirically, inertia 
is a prominent feature in institutional and especially individual holdings data that is associated 
with smaller merger announcement effects. 
 
C.3.  Diversification and focus 
Standard explanations for entering unrelated lines of business include agency problems or 
synergies, e.g., internal capital markets and tax shields. Likewise, moves toward greater focus 
are often interpreted as a triumph of governance. While our main task is to survey the existing 
literature, the topics of diversification and focus have yet to be considered from a perspective 
where investors are less than fully rational. So, we take a short detour here. We ask whether the 
evidence at hand is consistent with the view that the late-1960s conglomerate wave, which led to 
conglomerates so complex they were still being divested or busted up decades later, was in part 
driven by efforts to cater to a temporary investor appetite for conglomerates. 
Investor demand for conglomerates appears to have reached a peak in 1968. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987, p. 40) find that the average return on 13 leading conglomerates was 385% 
from July 1965 to June 1968, while the S&P 425 gained only 34%. Diversifying acquisitions 
were being greeted with a positive announcement effect, while other acquisitions were penalized 
(Matsusaka (1993)). Klein (2001) finds a “diversification premium” of 36% from 1966-68 in a 
sample of 36 conglomerates. Perhaps responding to these valuation incentives, conglomerate 
mergers accelerated in 1967 and peaked in 1968 (Ravenscraft and Scherer, pp. 24, 161, 218).  
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Conglomerate valuations started to fall in mid-1968. Between July 1968 and June 1970, 
the sample followed by Ravenscraft and Scherer lost 68%, three times more than the S&P 425. 
Announcement effects also suggest a switch in investor appetites: diversification announcements 
were greeted with a flat reaction in the mid- to late-1970s and a negative reaction by the 1980s 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990a)). Klein finds that the diversification premium turned into a 
discount of 1% in 1969-71 and 17% by 1972-74, and a discount seems to have remained through 
the 1980s (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)). Again, possibly in response to this 
shift in catering incentives, unrelated segments began to be divested, starting a long trend toward 
focus (Porter (1987), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)).8 Overall, while systematic evidence is 
lacking, the diversification and subsequent re-focus wave seems to fit the catering model well.  
 
D.  Financial policy 
The simple theoretical framework suggests that long-horizon managers may reduce the 
overall cost of capital paid by their ongoing investors by issuing overpriced securities and 
repurchasing underpriced securities. Here, we survey the evidence on the extent to which market 
timing affects equity issues, repurchases, debt issues, cross-border issues, and capital structure. 
 
D.1.  Equity issues 
Several lines of evidence suggest that overvaluation is a motive for equity issuance. Most 
simply, in the Graham and Harvey (2001) anonymous survey of CFOs of public corporations, 
two-thirds state that “the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was an 
                                                
8 In a case study of the diversification and subsequent refocus of General Mills, Donaldson (1990) writes that the 
company spent some effort “to verify the dominant trends in investor perceptions of corporate efficiency, as seen in 
the company study of the impact of excessive diversification on the trend of price-earnings multiples in the 1970s” 
(p. 140).  
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important or very important consideration” in issuing equity (p. 216). Several other questions in 
the survey also ask about the role of stock prices. Overall, stock prices are viewed as more 
important than nine out of ten factors considered in the decision to issue common equity, and the 
most important of five factors in the decision to issue convertible debt.  
Empirically, equity issuance is positively associated with plausible ex ante indicators of 
overvaluation. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) examine the determinants of Italian private 
firms’ decisions to undertake an IPO between 1982 and 1992, and find that the most important is 
the market-to-book ratio of seasoned firms in the same industry. Lerner (1994) finds that IPO 
volume in the biotech sector is highly correlated with biotech stock indexes. Loughran, Ritter, 
and Rydqvist (1994) find that aggregate IPO volume and stock market valuations are highly 
correlated in most major stock markets around the world. Similarly, Marsh (1982) examines the 
choice between (seasoned) equity and long-term debt by UK quoted firms between 1959 and 
1974, and finds that recent stock price appreciation tilts firms toward equity issuance. In US data, 
Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) also find a strong 
relationship between stock prices and seasoned equity issuance. 
Of course, there are many non-behavioral reasons why equity issuance and market 
valuations should be positively correlated. More specific evidence for equity market timing 
comes from the pattern that new issues earn low subsequent returns. In an early test, Stigler 
(1964) tried to measure the effectiveness of the S.E.C. by comparing the ex post returns of new 
equity issues (lumping together both initial and seasoned) from 1923-28 with those from 1949-
55. If the S.E.C. improved the pool of issuers, he reasoned, then the returns to issuers in the latter 
period should be higher. But he found that issuers in both periods performed about equally 
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poorly relative to a market index. Five years out, the average issuer in the pre-S.E.C. era lagged 
the market by 41%, while the average underperformance in the later period was 30%.  
Other sample periods show similar results. Ritter (1991) examines a sample of IPOs, 
Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995) examine SEOs, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine both. 
The last paper’s sample includes 4,753 IPOs and 3,702 SEOs between 1970 and 1990. Five years 
out, the average IPO earns lower returns than a size-matched control firm by 30%, and the 
average SEO underperforms that benchmark by 31%. Gompers and Lerner (2003) fill in the gap 
between the samples of Stigler (1964) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). Their sample of 3,661 
IPOs between 1935 and 1972 shows average five-year buy-and-hold returns that underperform 
the value-weighted market index by 21% to 35%.9 Thus, a rough summary of non-overlapping 
samples is that, on average, US equity issues underperform the market somewhere in the ballpark 
of 20-40% over five years.  
In a test that speaks closely to the question of opportunistic timing of new investors, 
Burch, Christie, and Nanda (2004) examine the subsequent performance of seasoned equity 
issued via rights offers, which are targeted to a firm’s ongoing shareholders, and firm 
commitment offers. In their 1933 to 1949 sample, a period in which rights offers were more 
common, they find underperformance entirely concentrated in the latter group. This fits exactly 
with the framework sketched above, which emphasizes the opportunistic timing of new investors. 
If equity issues cluster when the market as a whole is overvalued, the net gains to equity 
market timing may be even larger than the underperformance studies suggest. Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) examine whether equity issuance, relative to total equity and debt issuance, predicts 
                                                
9 Gompers and Lerner also confirm what Brav and Gompers (1997) found in a later sample: while IPOs have low 
absolute returns, and low returns relative to market indexes, they often do not do worse than stocks of similar size 
and book-to-market ratio. One interpretation is that securities with similar characteristics, whether or not they are 
IPOs, tend to be similarly priced (and mispriced) at a given point in time. 
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aggregate market returns between 1927 and 1999. They find that when the equity share was in its 
top historical quartile, the average value-weighted market return over the next year was negative 
6%, or 15% below the average market return. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004) find a 
similar relationship in several international markets over the period 1990 to 2001. In 12 out of 
the 13 markets they examine, average market returns are higher after a below-median equity 
share year than after an above-median equity share year.10 
The equity market timing studies continue to be hotly debated. Some authors highlight 
the joint hypothesis problem, proposing that the reason why IPOs and SEOs deliver low returns 
is that they are actually less risky. For more on this perspective, see Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 
(2000), Eckbo and Norli (2004), and the chapter by Eckbo in this volume. In a recent critique, 
Schultz (2003) points out that a small-sample bias he calls “pseudo market timing” can lead 
exaggerated impressions of underperformance when abnormal performance is calculated in 
“event time.” The empirical relevance of this bias has yet to be pinned down. Schultz (2003, 
2004) argues that it may be significant, while Ang, Gu, and Hochberg (2004), Dahlquist and de 
Jong (2004), and Viswanathan and Wei (2004) argue that it is minor.11 
We leave the resolution to future research, but we stress that the returns studies should 
not be considered in isolation. Survey evidence was mentioned above. Other relevant results 
include Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,b), who find that the equity issuers who manage 
                                                
10 Note that these aggregate predictability results should probably not be interpreted as evidence that “managers can 
time the aggregate market.” A more plausible explanation is that broad waves of investor sentiment lead many firms 
to be mispriced in the same direction at the same time. Then, the average financing decision will contain 
information about the average (i.e., market-level) mispricing, even though individual managers are perceiving and 
responding only to their own firm’s mispricing. 
11 Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2004) take Schultz’s idea to the time-series and argue that the equity share’s 
predictive power is due to an aggregate version of the pseudo market timing bias. Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler 
(2004) reply that the tests in Butler et al. actually have little relevance to the bias, and that simple simulation 
techniques show that small-sample bias can account for only one percent of the equity share’s actual predictive 
coefficient.  
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earnings most aggressively have the worst post-issue returns (we return to earnings management 
below). Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and Pagano et al. (1998) find 
that profitability deteriorates rapidly following the initial offering, and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) document a similar pattern with seasoned issues. Jenter (2004) finds that seasoned equity 
offerings coincide with insider selling. When viewed as a whole, the evidence indicates that 
market timing plays a nontrivial role in equity issues. 
 
D.2.  Repurchases 
Undervaluation is an important motive for repurchases. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2004) survey 384 CFOs regarding payout policy, and “the most popular response for 
all the repurchase questions on the entire survey is that firms repurchase when their stock is a 
good value, relative to its true value: 86.6% of all firms agree” (p. 26). Other work finds positive 
abnormal returns for firms that conduct repurchases, suggesting that managers are on average 
successful in timing them. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) study 1,239 open 
market repurchases announced between 1980 and 1990. Over the next four years, the average 
repurchaser earned 12% more than firms of similar size and book-to-market ratios. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) find similar results in a recent sample of Canadian firms. 
 The evidence shows that managers tend to issue equity before low returns, on average, 
and repurchase before higher returns. Is there a ballpark estimate of the reduction in the cost of 
equity, for the average firm, that these patterns imply? Without knowing just how the “rational” 
cost of equity varies over time, this question is hard to answer. However, suppose that rationally 
required returns are constant. By following aggregate capital inflows and outflows into corporate 
equities, and tracking the returns that follow these flows, Dichev (2004) reports that the average 
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“dollar-weighted” return is lower than the average buy-and-hold return by 1.3% per year for the 
NYSE/Amex, 5.3% for Nasdaq, and 1.5% (on average) for 19 stock markets around the world. 
Put differently, if NYSE/Amex firms had issued and repurchased randomly across time, then, 
holding the time series of realized returns fixed, they would have paid 1.3% per year more for 
the equity capital they employed.  
Of course, this reduction in the cost of equity capital is not evenly distributed in the cross 
section of firms. The difference between Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex gives a hint of this. For the 
many mature firms that rarely raise external equity, the gains may be negligible. For other firms 
that access the capital markets repeatedly through seasoned equity issues and stock-financed 
mergers, the gains may be much larger. 
 
D.3.  Debt issues 
A few papers have examined debt market timing, i.e., raising debt when its cost is 
unusually low. Survey evidence lends some initial plausibility to timing in this market as well. In 
particular, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that interest rates are the most cited factor in debt 
policy decisions: CFOs issue debt when they feel “rates are particularly low.” Expectations about 
the yield curve also appear to influence the maturity of new debt. Short-term debt is preferred 
“when short-term rates are low compared to long-term rates” and when “waiting for long-term 
market interest rates to decline.” Clearly, CFOs do not believe in the textbook version of the 
expectations hypothesis, under which the cost of debt is equal across maturities. At the same 
time, CFOs do not confess to exploiting their private information about credit quality, instead 
highlighting general debt market conditions. 
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On the empirical side, Marsh (1982), in his sample of UK firms, finds that the choice 
between debt and equity does appear to be swayed by the level of interest rates. And Guedes and 
Opler (1996) examine and largely confirm the survey responses regarding the effect of the yield 
curve. In a sample of 7,369 US debt issues between 1982 and 1993, they find that maturity is 
strongly negatively related to the term spread (the difference between long- and short-term bond 
yields), which was fluctuating considerably during this period.  
Is debt market timing successful in any sense? In aggregate data, Baker, Greenwood, and 
Wurgler (2003) examine the effect of debt market conditions on the maturity of debt issues and, 
perhaps more interesting, connect the maturity of new issues to subsequent bond market returns. 
Specifically, in US Flow of Funds data between 1953 and 2000, the aggregate share of long-term 
debt issues in total long- and short-term debt issues is negatively related to the term spread, just 
as Guedes and Opler find with firm-level data. Further, because the term spread is positively 
related to future excess bond returns—i.e. the difference in the returns of long-term and short-
term bonds, or the realized relative cost of long- and short-term debt—so is the long-term share 
in debt issues. Perhaps simply by using a naïve rule of thumb, “issue short-term debt when short-
term rates are low compared to long-term rates,” managers may have timed their debt maturity 
decisions so as to reduce their overall cost of debt. Of course, such a conclusion is subject to the 
usual risk-adjustment caveats. 
Unfortunately, the data on individual debt issues and their subsequent returns does not 
approach the level of detail of the IPO and SEO data. But one intriguing pattern that has been 
uncovered is that debt issues are followed by low equity returns. Speiss and Affleck-Graves 
(1999) examine 392 straight debt issues and 400 convertible issues between 1975 and 1989. The 
shares of straight debt issuers underperform a size- and book-to-market benchmark by an 
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insignificant 14% over five years (the median underperformance is significant), while 
convertible issuers underperform by a significant 37%. There is also a suggestion that the riskiest 
firms may be timing their idiosyncratic credit quality, despite the survey answers on this point: 
the shares of unrated issuers have a median five-year underperformance of 54%. If the equity did 
so poorly, the debt issues presumably also did poorly. In a much broader panel, Richardson and 
Sloan (2003) also find that net debt issuance is followed by low stock returns.  
 There are several potential explanations for this pattern. Certainly, equity overvaluation 
would be expected to lower the cost of debt directly—credit risk models routinely include stock 
market capitalization as an input—so the relationship with subsequent stock returns may reflect 
debt market timing per se. Or, managerial and investor sentiment is correlated; managers may 
tend to be most optimistic precisely when capital is cheap, and thus raise and invest as much as 
they can from any source. This story combines investor and managerial irrationality and so does 
not fit neatly within our taxonomy, but seems like a promising approach for future work. A third 
possibility, outlined in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), is that equity overvaluation relaxes a 
binding leverage constraint, creating debt capacity that subsequently gets used up. But debt is 
always correctly priced in this setting, so debt market timing per se is not possible. 
 
D.4.  Cross-border issues 
 The evidence in Froot and Dabora (1999) suggests that relative mispricings across 
international securities markets are possible, even between particularly liquid markets such as the 
US and the UK. This raises the possibility of international market timing. Along these lines, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that among US CFOs who have considered raising debt abroad, 
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44% implicitly dismissed covered interest parity in replying that lower foreign interest rates were 
an important or very important consideration in their decision.12 
 In practice, most international stock and bond issues are made on the US and UK 
markets. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004) find that when total foreign issues in the 
US or the UK are high, relative to respective GDP, subsequent returns on those markets tend to 
be low, particularly in comparison to the returns on issuers’ own markets. In a similar vein, and 
consistent with the survey evidence mentioned above, foreign firms tend to issue more debt in 
the US and the UK when rates there are low relative to domestic rates. 
 
D.5.  Capital structure 
As an accounting identity, every firm’s capital structure is the cumulative outcome of a 
long series of incremental financing decisions, each driven by the need to fund some investment 
project, consummate a merger, or achieve some other purpose. To the extent that market timing 
is a determinant of any of these incremental financing decisions, then, it may help to explain the 
cross-section of capital structure. In particular, if market timing-motivated financing decisions 
are not quickly rebalanced away, low-leverage firms will tend to be those that raised external 
finance when their stock prices were high, and hence those that tended to choose equity to 
finance past investments and mergers, and vice-versa for high leverage firms.13  
This market timing theory of capital structure is developed and tested in Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). In an effort to capture the historical coincidence of market valuations and the 
demand for external finance in a single variable, they construct an “external finance weighted-
                                                
12 Almost all equity raised by US corporations is placed in domestic markets, so Graham and Harvey do not ask 
about the determinants of international stock issues.  
13 Similarly, one could articulate a simple theory of debt maturity structure as reflecting the historical coincidence of 
debt issuance and debt market conditions like the term spread.  
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average” of a firm’s past market-to-book ratios. For example, a high value would mean that the 
firm raised the bulk of its external finance, equity or debt, when its market-to-book was high. If 
market timing has a persistent impact on capital structure, Baker and Wurgler argue, this variable 
will have a negative cross-sectional relationship to the debt-to-assets ratio, even in regressions 
that control for the current market-to-book ratio. In a broad Compustat sample from 1968 to 
1999, a strong negative relationship is apparent.  
 This evidence has inspired debate. Hovakimian (2004) argues that equity issues do not 
have persistent effects on capital structure, and that the explanatory power of the weighted 
average market-to-book arises because it contains information about growth opportunities, a 
likely determinant of target leverage, that is not captured in current market-to-book. Leary and 
Roberts (2003) and Kayhan and Titman (2004) also argue that firms rebalance toward a target. 
On the other hand, Chen and Zhao (2004b) point out that mean reversion in leverage is not 
definitive evidence for a tradeoff theory. Because leverage is a ratio, shocks tend to cause mean 
reversion mechanically. In an analysis of the choice between equity and debt issues, which 
avoids this problem, Chen and Zhao (2004a) find that deviation-from-target proxies have little 
explanatory power, while market-to-book and past stock returns are very important.  
 
E.  Other corporate decisions 
In this subsection, we consider what the irrational investors approach has to say about 
dividend policy, firm name changes, and earnings management.14 We also discuss recent work 
that looks at executive compensation from this perspective. 
                                                
14 We put dividend policy in this section and repurchases in the financing section, because, unlike a repurchase, pro-
rata dividends do not change the ownership structure of the firm, and there is no market timing benefit or cost. For 
this reason, it fits more naturally with the category of corporate decisions that might influence the level of 
mispricing, but do not otherwise transfer value among investors. 
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E.1.  Dividends 
The catering idea has been applied to dividend policy. Long (1978) provides some early 
motivation for this application. He finds that shareholders of Citizens Utilities put different 
prices on its cash dividend share class than its stock dividend share class, even though the value 
of the shares’ payouts are equal by charter. In addition, this relative price fluctuates. The unique 
experiment suggests that investors may view cash dividends per se as a salient characteristic, and 
in turn raises the possibility of a catering motive for paying them. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) outline and test a catering theory of dividends in aggregate 
US data between 1963 and 2000. They find that firms initiate dividends when the shares of 
existing payers are trading at a premium to those of nonpayers, and dividends are omitted when 
payers are at a discount. To measure the relative price of payers and nonpayers, they use an ex 
ante measure of mispricing they call the “dividend premium.” This is just the difference between 
the average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers. They also use ex post returns, and 
find that when the rate of dividend initiation increases, the future stock returns of payers (as a 
portfolio) are lower than those of nonpayers. This is consistent with the idea that firms initiate 
dividends when existing payers are relatively overpriced. 
Time-varying catering incentives also appear to shed light on the “disappearance” of 
dividends. Fama and French (2001) document that the percentage of Compustat firms that pay 
dividends declines from 67% in 1978 to 21% in 1999, and that only a part of this is due to the 
compositional shift towards small, unprofitable, growth firms which are generally less likely to 
pay dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) observe that the dividend premium switched sign 
from positive to negative in 1978 and has remained negative through 1999, suggesting that 
dividends may have been disappearing in part because of the consistently lower valuations put on 
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payers over this period. An analysis of earlier 1963-77 data also lends support to this idea. 
Dividends “appeared,” “disappeared,” and then “reappeared” in this period, and each shift 
roughly lines up with a flip in the sign of the dividend premium. In UK data, Ferris, Sen, and Yui 
(2004) find that dividends have been disappearing during the late 1990s, and that a dividend 
premium variable formed using UK stocks lines up with this pattern.  
The evidence suggests that the dividend supply responds to catering incentives, but why 
does investor demand for payers vary over time? One possibility is that “dividend clienteles” 
vary over time, for example with tax code changes. However, in US data, the dividend premium 
is unrelated to the tax disadvantage of dividend income, as is the rate of dividend initiation. 
Shefrin and Statman (1984) develop explanations for why investors prefer dividends based on 
self-control problems, prospect theory, mental accounting, and regret aversion. Perhaps these 
elements vary over time. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) argue that the dividend premium reflects 
sentiment for “risky” nonpaying growth firms versus “safe” dividend payers, since it falls in 
growth stock bubbles and rises in crashes. Fuller and Goldstein (2003) show more explicitly that 
payers outperform in market downturns. Perhaps investors seek the perceived safety of cash 
dividends in these gloomy periods, and bid up the shares of payers.  
There are clear limitations to a catering theory of dividends, however. For one, it is a 
descriptive theory of whether firms pay dividends at all, not how much—in US data, at least, the 
dividend premium does not explain aggregate fluctuations in the level of dividends. Also, it 
works better for explaining initiations than omissions, and it has little to say about the strong 
persistence in dividend policy. Catering is probably best viewed as one building block in an 
overall descriptive theory of dividend policy.  
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E.2.  Firm names 
Name changes provide some of the simplest and most colorful examples of catering. In 
frictionless and efficient markets, firm names should be about as irrelevant as dividends. But 
there is a low fundamental cost of changing names, and perhaps through a name change a firm 
can create a salient association with an overpriced category of stocks.  
Evidence of a catering motive for corporate names is most prominent in bubbles. In the 
1959-62 era which Malkiel (1990) refers to as the “tronics boom,” firms “often included some 
garbled version of the word ‘electronics’ in their title even if the companies had nothing to do 
with the electronics industry” (p. 54). Systematic evidence has been assembled for the Internet 
bubble. Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) find that 147 (generally small) firms changed to 
“dotcom” names between June 1998 and July 1999, as Internet valuations were rapidly rising. 
Catering to Internet sentiment did seem to deliver a short-term price boost: Cooper et al. report 
an average announcement effect of 74% for their main sample, and an even larger effect for the 
subset that had little true involvement with the Internet. Interestingly, Cooper et al. (2004) find 
that names were also used to dissociate companies from the Internet sector, as prices started 
crashing. Between August 2000 and September 2001, firms that dropped their dotcom name saw 
a positive announcement effect of around 70%. The effect was almost as large for firms that 
dropped the dotcom name but kept an Internet business focus, and for the “double dippers” 
which dropped the name they had newly adopted just a few years earlier.  
The names of mutual funds also seem to be sensitive to investor sentiment. Cooper, 
Gulen, and Rau (2003) find that fund names shift away from styles that experience low returns 
and toward those with high returns. The authors find that name changes do not predict fund 
performance, yet inflows increase dramatically, even for “cosmetic” name changers whose 
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underlying investment style remains constant. Presumably, then, the name change decision is 
driven in part by the desire to attract fund inflows, which increase the fund’s size and the fees its 
managers earn. Indeed, Cooper et al. find that the inflow effect is increased when money is spent 
to advertise the “new” styles. While we group this study with other name changes, it actually 
involves an investment policy decision, in the sense that the goal of the name change is to 
increase the fundamental value of the franchise. 
 
E.3.  Earnings management 
 The quarterly net income figure that managers report to shareholders does not equal 
actual economic cash flows, but instead includes various non-cash accruals, some of which are 
fairly discretionary. According to the survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2004), CFOs 
believe that investors care more about earnings per share than cash flows.15  
 As the irrational investors theory predicts, managers with “short horizons” are especially 
likely to manage earnings. Bergstresser and Philippon (2004) find that accruals management 
increases as the CEO’s compensation, via stock and options holdings, becomes more sensitive to 
current share prices. Sloan (1996) finds that firms with high accruals earn low subsequent 
returns, which suggests that earnings management may be successful in boosting share price, or 
at least in maintaining overvaluation. Consistent with the view that managers use earnings 
management to fool investors and issue overvalued equity, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,b) 
find that initial and seasoned equity issuer underperformance is greatest for firms that most 
aggressively manage pre-issue earnings.  
                                                
15 There is a large literature in financial accounting on corporate earnings management. Here, we offer a brief and 
incomplete review, focusing on the link between earnings management and corporate financing decisions. 
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An interesting and largely unexplored question is whether earnings management has 
serious consequences for investment. Graham et al. (2004) present CFOs with hypothetical 
scenarios and find that 41% of them would be willing to pass up a positive-NPV project just to 
meet the analyst consensus EPS estimate. Direct evidence of this type of value loss is difficult to 
document, but Jensen (2004) presents a range of anecdotes, and highly suggestive empirical 
studies include Teoh et al. (1998a,b), Erickson and Wang (1999), Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 
(2004), and Pshisva and Saurez (2004). The last three papers report that earnings management 
activity increases prior to stock acquisitions.  
 
E.4.  Executive compensation 
In the theoretical framework at the beginning of this section, we assumed that managers 
may have the incentive to cater to short-term mispricing. One question is why shareholders do 
not set up executive compensation contracts to force managers to take the long view.16 Bolton, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) suggest that short horizons may be an equilibrium outcome. 
They study the optimal incentive compensation contract for the dynamic speculative market of 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), in which two groups of overconfident investors trade shares back 
and forth as their relative optimism fluctuates. The share price in this market contains a 
speculative option component, reflecting the possibility that nonholders might suddenly become 
willing to buy at a high price. Bolton et al. find that the optimal contract may induce the CEO to 
take costly actions that exacerbate differences of opinion, thus increasing the value of the option 
component of stock prices, at the expense of long-run value.  
                                                
16 A separate but related question is how managers compensate lower level employees within the firm. Bergman and 
Jenter (2004) argue that rational managers may minimize costs by paying optimistic employees in overvalued 
equity, in the form of options grants. Benartzi (2001) offers a foundation for this sort of optimism, showing that 
employees have a tendency to extrapolate past returns, and as a consequence hold too much company stock. See also 
Core and Guay (2001) and Oyer and Schaefer (2004). 
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III.  The irrational managers approach 
The second approach to behavioral corporate finance takes the opposite extreme, in 
which irrational managers operate in efficient capital markets. To be more precise, by irrational 
managerial behavior we mean behavior that departs from rational expectations and expected 
utility maximization of the manager. We are not interested in rational moral hazard behavior, 
such as empire building, stealing, and plain slacking off. Instead, we are concerned with 
situations where the manager believes that he is actually close to maximizing firm value—and, in 
the process, some compensation scheme—but is in fact deviating from this ideal. 
As in the irrational investors approach, an extra building block is required. In order for 
less-than-fully-rational managers to have an impact, corporate governance must be limited in its 
ability to constrain them into making rational decisions. In general, an assumption of limited 
governance seems like a reasonable one to maintain. Takeover battles and proxy fights are 
notoriously blunt tools. Boards may be more a part of the problem than the solution if they have 
their own biases or are pawns of management. And unlike in a traditional agency problem, which 
arises when there is a conflict of interest between managers and outside investors, standard 
incentive contracts have little effect: An irrational manager may well think that he is maximizing 
value. Finally, in the US, a significant element of managerial discretion is codified in the 
business judgment rule. See Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2004) and Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) for direct evidence that managers have discretion, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a 
broader review of corporate governance institutions.  
The psychology and economics literatures relevant to managerial behavior are vast. For 
us, the main themes are that individuals do not always form beliefs logically, nor do these beliefs 
convert to decisions in a consistent and rational manner—see Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 
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(2002) and Kahneman and Tversky (2000) for collected works. Thus far, most research in 
corporate finance has focused on the positive illusions of optimism and overconfidence. 
Illustrating the pattern of optimism, Weinstein (1980) finds that subjects tend to believe 
themselves to be more likely than average to experience positive future life events (e.g. owning 
own home, living past 80) and less likely to experience negative events (being fired, getting 
cancer). Illustrating overconfidence in one’s own skills, Svenson (1981) finds that 82% of a 
sample of students placed themselves in the top 30% in terms of driving safety. 
There are good reasons to focus on these particular biases in a managerial setting. First, 
they are strong and robust, having been documented in many samples, in particular samples of 
managers (Larwood and Whittaker (1977), March and Shapira (1987), and Ben-David (2004)). 
Second, they are often fairly easy to integrate into existing models, in that optimism can be 
modeled as an overestimate of a mean and overconfidence as an underestimate of a variance. 
Third, overconfidence leads naturally to more risk-taking. Even if there is no overconfidence on 
average in the population of potential managers, those that are overconfident are more likely to 
perform extremely well (and extremely badly), placing them disproportionately in the ranks of 
upper (and former) management. And fourth, even if managers start out without bias, an 
attribution bias—the tendency to take greater responsibility for success than failure (e.g., Langer 
and Roth (1975))—may lead successful managers to become overconfident, as in Gervais and 
Odean (2001).  
After reviewing the theory and evidence on optimism and overconfidence, we turn briefly 
to potential applications of bounded rationality and reference-point preferences. Given the state 
of the literature, our treatment there is necessarily more speculative. Further, we do not discuss at 
all the impact of several other judgmental biases, such as representativeness, availability, 
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anchoring, and narrow framing—not because we believe them to be unimportant, but because no 
systematic studies of their impacts on corporate finance decisions have yet been conducted. 
 
A.  Theoretical framework 
The idea of managerial optimism and overconfidence in finance dates at least to Roll 
(1986). The derivation below is in the spirit of Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2004), 
as modified to match our earlier notation as much as possible. We start by assuming the manager 
is optimistic about the value of the firm’s assets and investment opportunities. He then balances 
two conflicting goals. The first is to maximize perceived fundamental value. To capture this, we 
augment fundamental value with an optimism parameter γ, 
( ) ( ) KKf −⋅+ ,1 γ , 
where f is increasing and concave in new investment K. Note that here, the manager is optimistic 
about both the assets in place (f can include a constant term) and new opportunities. Once again, 
if traditional market imperfections cause the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem to fail, 
financing may enter f alongside investment. 
The manager’s second concern is to minimize the perceived cost of capital. We assume 
here that the manager acts on behalf of existing investors, because of his own stake in the firm 
and fiduciary duty. This leads to a similar setup to the market timing objective in Section II.A., 
except that an optimistic manager believes there is never a good time to issue equity. In 
particular, since the capital market is efficient and values the firm at its true fundamental value of 
f-K, the manager believes that the firm is undervalued by γf, and thus in selling a fraction of the 
firm e he perceives that existing, long-run shareholders will lose 
( )⋅,Kfeγ . 
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Putting the two concerns together, the optimistic manager chooses new investment and 
financing to solve 
( ) ( ) ( )⋅−−⋅+ ,,1max
,
KfeKKf
eK
γγ . 
We do not explicitly include a budget constraint. Instead, again to keep the notation simple, we 
consider its reduced-form impact on f.  
Differentiating with respect to K and e gives the optimal investment and financial policy 
of an optimistic manager operating in efficient capital markets: 
( ) ( )γeKf K −+=⋅ 11
1, , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅+⋅=⋅+ ,,,1 KefKfKf ee γγ . 
Put into words, the first condition is about investment policy. Instead of setting the 
marginal value created from investment equal to the true cost of capital, normalized to be one 
here, managers overinvest, to the point where the marginal value creation is less than one. The 
more optimistic (γ) is the manager and the less equity (e) he is forced to raise in financing 
investment, the greater the problem. The second is about financing. The marginal value lost from 
shifting the firm’s current capital structure away from equity is weighed against the perceived 
market timing losses. As in the analysis of irrational investors, we consider some special cases. 
Investment policy. If there is no optimal capital structure, so that fe is equal to zero, the 
manager will not issue equity, setting e to zero, and there is no interaction among financing, 
internal funds, and investment. In this case, the optimistic manager will clearly overinvest: fK is 
less than unity. In Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2004), there is an optimal capital 
structure, or more precisely an upper bound on debt. If the manager needs equity to invest (fe 
greater than zero, here), the degree of overinvestment falls. 
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Needing equity is akin to having little cash or cash flow available for investment. Thus in 
this setup, investment can be strongly related to current cash flow and profits, controlling for 
investment opportunities. This leads to a behavioral foundation for the Jensen (1986) agency 
costs of free cash flow. But instead of receiving private benefits of control, managers are simply 
overconfident and overinvest from current resources as a result. Leverage reduces the degree of 
overinvestment by increasing fe, thereby increasing equity issues e and reducing K. 
In a more complex specification, these conclusions may change. One might have the 
manager optimistic only about assets in place, in which case there is no overinvestment, and 
there will typically be underinvestment as a firm approaches its debt capacity. Also, it is worth 
emphasizing that we are examining optimism in isolation here. Layering on other imperfections, 
such as risk aversion, may mean that optimism moves investment from an inefficiently low level 
toward the first best, as in Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2003) and Goel and Thakor (2002). In a 
related vein, Hackbarth (2003) argues that managerial optimism and overconfidence can reduce 
the underinvestment associated with debt overhang, as in Myers (1977). 
Financial policy. An optimistic manager never sells equity unless he has to. If there is an 
upper bound on leverage (fe greater than zero, here), optimism predicts a ‘pecking order’ of 
financing decisions: The manager relies on internal capital and debt and uses outside equity only 
as a last resort. Again, other imperfections may mitigate the aversion to equity. If the manager is 
risk averse with an undiversified position in the firm’s equity, for example, he may wish to issue 
equity even though it is below what he thinks it to be worth. 
Other corporate decisions. It is not as easy to incorporate other decisions into this 
framework. Consider dividend policy. If the manager is more optimistic about future cash flow 
and assets in place than outside investors, he might view a dividend payment as more 
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sustainable. On the other hand, if he views future investment opportunities, and hence funding 
requirements, as greater, he might be reluctant to initiate or increase dividends and retain internal 
funds instead. This analysis requires a more dynamic model of investment and cash flow and a 
decomposition of firm value into assets in place and growth opportunities.  
 
B.  Empirical challenges 
If the main obstacle to testing the irrational investors approach is finding a proxy for 
misvaluation, the challenge here is to identify optimism, overconfidence, or the behavioral bias 
of interest. Without an empirical measure, the irrational managers approach is difficult to 
distinguish from traditional agency theory, in particular. That is, in Stein (2003), an empire-
building manager will 
( ) ( ) ( )ecKKf
eK
−−+ γ1max
,
, 
where γ reflects the preference for or the private benefits that come with presiding over a larger 
firm, as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Grossman and Hart (1988), rather than optimism. 
Rational investors recognize the agency problem up front, so c reflects the cost of raising outside 
equity, and management and existing shareholders bear the agency costs. 
This reduced form is almost identical to the objective function of an optimistic manager. 
Both can generate overinvestment, underinvestment, cash flow-investment sensitivities, pecking 
order financing, and so forth. Moreover, Stein points out that the agency model is itself hard to 
distinguish from models of costly external finance built on asymmetric information. Thus, to test 
the behavioral theories, one must separate the γ related to overconfidence and optimism from the 
γ that arises from agency or asymmetric information problems. 
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C.  Investment policy 
Despite the obvious difficulty of obtaining direct, manager-level measures of optimism 
and overconfidence, evidence is accumulating that these biases do affect business investment. 
 
C.1.  Real investment 
 We begin with startup investments. The evidence indicates that entrepreneurial startups 
are generally made under a halo of overconfidence and optimism. Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg 
(1998) find that 68% of entrepreneurs think that their startup is more likely to succeed than 
comparable enterprises, while only 5% believe that their odds are worse, and a third of 
entrepreneurs view their success as essentially guaranteed. The survey responses of French 
entrepreneurs tabulated in Landier and Thesmar (2004) also seem consistent with an initial 
underestimation of the task of starting a firm: At startup, 56% expect “development” in the near 
future, and 6% expect “difficulties.” 
  The actual performance of startup investments is more sobering. Landier and Thesmar 
find that when surveyed three years into their endeavor, only 38% of French entrepreneurs 
expect further “development” while 17% anticipate “difficulty.” Leaving profitability aside 
entirely, only half of all startups survive more than three years (Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, 
and Woo (2002)). Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) argue more generally that the return 
on private equity in the US between 1952 and 1999 is lower than seems justified given the 
undiversified nature of entrepreneurial investment. As a whole, the evidence on startup 
investments seems consistent with the overconfidence that Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) 
experimental subjects display when making entry decisions. 
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Optimism also appears to influence investment in more mature firms. Merrow, Phillips, 
and Myers (1981) compare forecast and actual construction costs for pioneer process plants in 
the energy industry. There is a strong optimism bias in project cost forecasts, with actual costs 
typically more than double the initial estimates. Statman and Tyebjee (1985) survey several other 
studies of this sort, involving military hardware, drugs, chemicals, and other development 
projects, and conclude that optimistic biases in cost and sales forecasts are fairly widespread.  
Malmendier and Tate (2004) provide cross-sectional tests of the effects of optimism in a 
broader sample. They form a clever manager-level proxy for optimism: the propensity for a 
manager to voluntarily hold in-the-money stock options in his own firm. The intuition is that 
since the CEO’s human capital is already so exposed to firm-specific risk, voluntarily holding in-
the-money options can be seen as a strong vote of optimism.17 With this optimism proxy in hand 
for a large sample of US firms between 1980 and 1994, Malmendier and Tate find that the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow is higher for the more optimistic CEOs. This sensitivity is 
especially high for optimistic CEOs in equity-dependent firms, that is, in situations where 
perceived financial constraints are most binding. Their results support the predictions of the basic 
optimism model.  
While the empirical evidence that optimism affects investment may not seem extensive, 
keep in mind that optimism, as discussed earlier, shares many predictions with more established 
theories, and thus is a candidate to explain various earlier results. For example, the fact that 
managers invest rather than pay out cash windfalls (Blanchard, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1994)) looks like a moral hazard problem, but is also consistent with optimism. Likewise, some 
investment patterns that look like adverse-selection-driven costly external finance may actually 
                                                
17 Malmendier and Tate find that the propensity to voluntarily retain in-the-money options is not significantly related 
to future abnormal stock returns, supporting their assumption that such behavior indeed reflects optimism rather than 
genuine inside information. 
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reflect a mistaken managerial belief that external finance is costlier. A possible example is the 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivities among younger and entrepreneurial firms (Schaller 
(1993)), which as noted above appear to be run by especial optimists. 
 
C.2.  Mergers and acquisitions 
Roll (1986) pioneered the optimism and overconfidence approach to corporate finance 
with his “hubris” theory of acquisitions. He suggests that successful acquirers may be optimistic 
and overconfident in their own valuation of deal synergies, and fail to properly account for the 
winner’s curse. Roll interprets the evidence on merger announcement effects, surveyed by Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) and more recently by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), as well as the lack of evidence of fundamental value creation 
through mergers, as consistent with this theory.  
More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2003) develop this argument and use their proxy 
for CEO optimism, outlined above, to test it. They find a number of patterns consistent with the 
optimism and overconfidence theory. First, optimistic CEOs complete more mergers, especially 
diversifying mergers, which are perhaps of more dubious value. Second, optimism has its biggest 
effect among the least equity dependent firms, i.e. when managers do not have to weigh the 
merger against an equity issue that they, as optimists, would perceive as undervalued. Third, 
investors are more skeptical about bid announcements when they are made by optimistic CEOs. 
This last result is consistent with the theme of irrational managers operating in efficient 
markets.18  
 
                                                
18 For additional, anecdotal evidence on the role of hubris in takeovers, see Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) 
and Shefrin (2000, chapter 16).  
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D.  Financial policy 
Direct empirical tests of how optimism and overconfidence affects financing patterns is 
not extensive. Existing work addresses capital structure and financial contracting.  
 
D.1.  Capital structure 
The basic optimism model predicts a pecking order financing policy. Thus, much of the 
existing evidence of pecking-order policies, from Donaldson (1961) to Fama and French (2002), 
is at face value equally consistent with pervasive managerial optimism. And the notion of 
pervasive managerial optimism does not seem farfetched. In Graham’s (1999) (anonymous) 
survey, almost two-thirds of CFOs state their stock is undervalued while only three percent state 
it is overvalued. Such responses are all the more striking given the fact that the survey was taken 
shortly before the Internet crash. 
To distinguish optimism from other explanations of pecking order behavior (for example, 
adverse selection as in Myers and Majluf (1984)), a natural test would use cross-sectional 
variation in measured optimism to see whether such behavior is more prevalent in firms run by 
optimists. To our knowledge, exactly this test has yet to be conducted, but certain results in 
Malmendier and Tate (2003, 2004) have a closely related flavor. First, and as noted above, firms 
run by optimists (as identified by the Malmendier and Tate options-based proxies for optimism) 
display a higher sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. Second, managers classified as 
optimistic show a differentially higher propensity to make acquisitions when they are not 
dependent on external equity.  
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D.2.  Financial contracting  
 Landier and Thesmar (2004) examine financial contracting between rational investors 
and optimistic entrepreneurs.19 They highlight two aspects of contracting with optimists. First, 
because optimists tend to inefficiently persist in their initial business plan, the optimal contract 
transfers control when changes are necessary. (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that contingent 
transfers of control are common features of venture capital contracts.) Second, because optimists 
believe good states to be more likely, they are willing to trade some control and ownership rights 
in bad states for greater claims in good ones; in this sense, the optimal contract “pays the 
entrepreneur with dreams.” Ultimately, optimists may self-select into short-term debt, as it 
transfers payments and control to the investor in states that seem unlikely to occur, while realistic 
entrepreneurs prefer less risky long-term debt.  
Landier and Thesmar find some empirical evidence of this separation in a data set of 
French entrepreneurs. Among other results, they find that the use of short-term debt is positively 
related to an ex post measure of optimistic expectations, the difference between realized growth 
and initial growth expectations. They also find that the use of short-term debt is positively related 
to psychologically-motivated instruments for expectations, such as regional sunlight exposure 
and rates of mental depression. 
 
E.  Other behavioral patterns 
 In the remainder of the survey, we briefly explore patterns other than optimism and 
overconfidence, in particular bounded rationality and reference-point preferences.  
 
                                                
19 Manove and Padilla (1999) also consider how banks separate optimists and realists. They focus on the overall 
efficiency of the credit market.  
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E.1.  Bounded rationality 
Perhaps the simplest deviation from the benchmark of full rationality is bounded 
rationality, introduced by Simon (1955). Bounded rationality assumes that some type of 
cognitive or information-gathering cost prevents agents from making fully optimal decisions. 
Boundedly-rational managers cope with complexity by using rules of thumb that ensure an 
acceptable level of performance and, hopefully, avoid severe bias. Conlisk (1996) reviews the 
bounded rationality literature.  
Rules of thumb are hardly uncommon in financial management. For example, the net 
present value criterion is the optimal capital budgeting rule (in efficient markets), yet in practice 
managers employ various simpler rules. Gitman and Forrester (1977) find that less than 10% of 
103 large firms use NPV as their primary technique, while over 50% use the IRR rule, which 
avoids a cost of capital calculation. The Graham and Harvey (2001) survey of CFOs also finds 
that the IRR rule is more widely used than NPV, and over 50% of CFOs use the payback period 
rule, an even less sophisticated rule that requires neither a cost of capital input nor forecasts of 
cash flows beyond a cutoff date. Graham and Harvey also find that among managers who do use 
a discounting procedure, it is common to apply a firm-wide discount rate rather than a project-
specific rate, again in stark contrast to normative principles.20  
 Other instances of rule-based management include the use of simple targets for capital 
structures and payouts. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 10% of the CFOs in their sample 
use a “very strict” target debt-equity ratio and 34% use a “somewhat tight” target or range. Such 
leverage targets are typically defined in terms of book value, and Welch (2004) confirms that 
                                                
20 A good question is whether the use of such rules is better understood as an agency problem than as bounded 
rationality. That is, executives might use simple rules to shorten the workday and save time for golf. However, 
Graham and Harvey find that high-ownership managers are if anything less likely to use NPV and more likely to use 
the payback period rule. 
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market leverage is, to a large extent, allowed to float with stock prices. Likewise, the Lintner 
(1956) field interviews revealed a set of common rules of thumb in payout policy that led him to 
an empirically accurate specification for dividends. 
 
E.2.  Reference-point preferences 
Psychological experiments and intuition suggest that people value changes in economic 
states, such as wealth or performance, not just levels. This is reflected in the value function in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, which is defined in terms of gains and losses 
relative to a reference point.  
In corporate finance, the most developed application of reference-point preferences has 
been to IPO underpricing, the pattern that the initial offering price is, on average, below the 
market price that prevails after a day of trading. (For more on this, see the chapter by Ljungqvist 
in this volume.) There are, of course, many non-behavioral explanations for this pattern. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) develop an explanation that combines reference-point preferences 
and mental accounting (Thaler (1980, 1985)). They assume that issuing managers mentally 
account for two quantities in judging an offering’s success: the (perceived) gain from the gap 
between the first day closing price and a natural reference point, the midpoint of the file price 
range; and the (real) loss from the dilutive effect of the underpricing. If the gain is judged to 
outweigh the loss, where each is evaluated with the prospect theory value function, the 
executives are net satisfied. Intuitively, they may be too overwhelmed by the “windfall” gain 
versus the reference point to complain much about underpricing.21 
                                                
21 Loughran and Ritter assume that the underwriter prefers underpricing, perhaps because it generates profitable 
rent-seeking activities among investors, e.g. trading with the underwriter’s brokerage arm, or because it reduces 
marketing costs. 
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This setup is designed, in part, to explain the pattern that underpricing is greater when the 
offer price is above the initial file price range. Hanley (1993) finds that in issues where the offer 
price is below the minimum of the file price range, first-day returns are a relatively small 4%, on 
average, while those priced above the maximum have average first-day returns of 32%. This is 
consistent with issuers acquiescing in severe underpricing only when they are simultaneously 
getting good news in the form of upward revisions from the filing range.22 Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2004) test some of the behavioral underpinnings of the Loughran and Ritter view. 
Using data on the ownership stakes of executives in IPO firms, they crudely proxy for the 
proposed notion of issuer satisfaction by taking the dollar amount of executives’ perceived 
“gain” from revisions from the midpoint of the file price range and subtracting the dollar amount 
of dilution due to underpricing. They find that executive teams that are more “satisfied” with 
their IPOs by this criterion are more likely to use the same underwriter for seasoned offerings, 
and to pay higher fees for those transactions. 
 A different application of reference-point thinking is the widely asserted, but less well 
documented, managerial propensity to “throw good money after bad.” Such behavior is most 
relevant for us to the extent that it reflects something more than rational career concerns, e.g. a 
situation where the manager tries to distort the updating process to maintain high compensation. 
Shefrin (2001) offers several anecdotes concerning major corporate investments that have the 
flavor of good money after bad, and Statman and Sepe (1989) find that the market reaction to the 
termination of historically unprofitable investment projects is positive, suggesting that investors 
recognize that executives have a tendency to continue poor projects. Related evidence comes 
from the Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) study of drug development decisions. Those authors find 
                                                
22 See Benveniste and Spindt (1989) for an alternative explanation for this asymmetry based on information 
gathering in the book-building process; and Edelen and Kadlec (2003) for an alternative explanation, based on 
sample truncation bias related to the withdrawl of IPOs whose prospects deteriorate during the waiting period. 
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that single-product early stage firms appear highly reluctant to abandon their only viable drug 
candidates, even when the results of clinical trials are less than promising. Some combination of 
agency, managerial optimism, and a gambling-to-get-back-to-even attitude seems like a plausible 
explanation for these results.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The behavioral corporate finance literature has matured to the point where one can now 
sketch out a handful of canonical theoretical frameworks and use them to organize the 
accumulated evidence of dozens of empirical studies. This survey suggests that the behavioral 
approaches to corporate finance offer a useful complement to the other paradigms in the field. 
They deliver intuitive and sometimes quite compelling explanations for important financing and 
investing patterns, including some that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory.  
In its current state of flux, the field offers a number of exciting research questions. We 
close by highlighting just a few. In no particular order, we wonder: 
• Are behavioral factors at the root of why managers do not more aggressively pursue the 
tax benefits of debt, as in Graham (2000)? 
• While the existing literature has generally considered the two approaches separately, the 
irrational manager and irrational investor stories can certainly coexist. Would a model 
featuring a correlation between investor and managerial sentiment, for example, lead to 
new insights? 
• What are the determinants of managerial “horizons,” and how can they be measured and 
appropriately governed? Polk and Sapienza (2004) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004) 
use share turnover by investors to proxy for shareholder horizons.  
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• To what extent should the venture capital industry be viewed as an institution that 
identifies and caters to emerging pockets of investor sentiment? 
• What determines investor sentiment, and how is it managed through corporate investor 
relations? Potential avenues to consider are interactions with past stock market returns, 
technological change and the valuation of new industries, media coverage, financial 
analysts and financial reporting, or investment banking. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) 
offer an overview of investor relations. 
• Do equity and debt market timing reduce the overall cost of capital by a large amount, or 
just a little? Dichev (2004) offers an approach here. 
• To what extent can features of financial contracts be understood as a response to assorted 
behavioral biases? Williamson took first steps here. Regarding consumer contracts, Della 
Vigna and Malmendier (2004) suggest that credit cards and health club contracts, among 
others, are shaped by naïve expectations and time inconsistent preferences.  
• How should one approach the proper regulation of inefficient markets?  
• What are the limits of corporate arbitrage, including detecting and generating mispricing, 
maintaining reputation, and avoiding fraud? 
• Can a catering approach help to explain the diversification and subsequent re-focus wave 
that has taken place in the US since the late-1960s? We speculated in Section II.C.2., but 
are aware of no systematic studies.  
• How significant is the economy-wide misallocation of capital caused by collected 
behavioral distortions, and in particular how do these distortions interact with traditional 
capital market imperfections? For example, if there is underinvestment due to agency or 
asymmetric information, bubbles may bring investment closer to the efficient level.  
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• What are the behavioral underpinnings of Lintner’s (1956) dividend model?  
• If bounded rationality or investor pressures lead managers to rely on specific performance 
metrics, will third parties exploit this? The marketing of takeovers and financing vehicles 
as EPS-improving transactions by investment banks is a potential example.  
• To what extent are corporate “hedging” policies actually directional bets? The evidence 
in Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2002) and Faulkender (2004) suggests that in many 
companies, interest rate risk management and the use of derivatives has little to do with 
textbook hedging.  
• In the Introduction, we pointed out that the normative implication of the irrational 
investors approach is to insulate managers from short-term market pressures, while the 
implication of the irrational managers approach is to obligate them to follow market 
prices. What, in the end, is the right balance?  
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